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Abstract
Consider Plurality with random tie-breaking. This paper uses standard axiomatic extensions of
preferences over elements to preferences over sets (Kelly, Gardenfors, Responsiveness) to characterize
all better-replies of a voter under stochastic dominance.
1 Introduction
Suppose that a decision maker has to select a subset of alternatives W ⊆ C, |C| = m. The agent has
linear preferences order Q over all alternatives c ∈ C. Denote by C(j) the j most preferred items in
C according to Q. Lottery p stochastically dominates p′ according to preference Q if for every j ≤ m,
Prw∼p(w ∈ C
(j)) > Prw∼p′(w ∈ C
(j)).
Here we assume that given a set W of “possibly winning outcomes”, the actual outcome w ∈ W
is selected from W uniformly at random. Without further information or restrictions on the agent’s
preferences, Q can be extended to preferences Qˆ over 2A in various ways. In particular, Q induces
a partial preference order Qˆ once we enforce stochastic dominance: Each set W determines a lottery
pW over outcomes in C (by our assumption, a uniform lottery over W ). We say that X stochastically
dominates Y is pX stochastically dominates pY . Intuitively, it means that the agent should prefer X
over Y if she believes tie-breaking is going to be selected uniformly at random from the set, regardless of
anything else.
To see that SD is only a partial relation, consider the preference a ≻ b ≻ c, and the sets X = {b}, Y =
{a, c}. Whether the agent prefers X or Y may depend on her cardinal utilities. E.g. for utilities (4, 2, 1)
we have Y ≻ X , whereas for utilities (4, 3, 1) we have X ≻ Y . More generally, it is known that X
stochastically dominates Y if and only if X ≻ Y for any cardinal utility scale u consistent with Q.
1.1 Axioms
Let Qˆ be the partial order over 2C derived from Q and SD. We would like to find a natural axiomatic
characterization of Qˆ, i.e. one that uses familiar axioms rather than lotteries and cardinal utilities.
Here are three axioms that have been suggested in the literature for extending preferences over ele-
ments to preferences over subsets.
Axiom Name and reference Definition
K1 Kelly [Kelly, 1977] (∀a ∈ X, b ∈ Y, a ≻ b) ⇒ X ≻ Y
K2 “ “ (∀a ∈ X, b ∈ Y, a  b) ⇒ X  Y
G Ga¨rdenfors [Ga¨rdenfors, 1976] (∀b ∈ X, a ≻i b) ⇒ {a} ≻ ({a} ∪X) ≻ X
R Responsiveness [Roth, 1985] a ≻i b ⇐⇒ ∀X ⊆ C \ {a, b}, ({a} ∪X) ≻ ({b} ∪X)
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1.2 Contribution
If X stochastically dominates Y , then this cannot violate any of the Axioms K+G+R. Yet, it is possible
that X SD Y but this does not follow from the axioms. In the paper we show two results.
1. Suppose the winner set W is the outcome of the Plurality rule. The axioms K+G+R characterize
Qˆ on all pairs of outcomes X,Y such that a single voter can change the outcome from X to Y .
That is, the axioms characterize all better-replies in the game defined by the Plurality voting rule
over candidates C with uniform random tie breaking and stochastic dominance.
2. We introduce another axiom called monotone duplication (MD) s.t. axioms K+MD+R characterize
Qˆ for any pair of outcomes.
2 Characterization of Better-Replies in Plurality
Definition 2.1. Suppose that X,Y ⊆ C, k = |X | ≤ |Y | = K. Sort X,Y in increasing order by Q. Let
rj =
⌈
j
k
K
⌉
. Partition Y into sets Y1, . . . , Yk s.t. for j < K, Yj = {yrj−1+1, . . . , yrj} (e.g., if k = 3,K = 7,
then Y is partitioned into Y1 = {y1, y2, y3}, Y2 = {y4, y5}, Y3 = {y6, y7}).
X match-dominates Y according to Q if:
• (I) ∀j ≤ k∀y ∈ Yj, xj  y; and
• either (IIa) at least one relation is strict, or (IIb) K mod k 6= 0.
If |X | > |Y |, then X match-dominates Y if Y match-dominates X according to the reverse of Q.
Intuitively, match-domination means that for any q ∈ [0, 1], there is a fraction q of the set X that
dominates a fraction of 1 − q from the set Y : at least one x ∈ X dominates all of Y , at least 20% of X
dominate at least 80% of Y , and so on.
Lemma 1. Let a, a′ be two profiles that differ by a single vote, and define X = f(a), Y = f(a′).1
The following conditions are equivalent for any strict order Q over C:
1. X stochastically dominates Y under preferences Q and uniform lottery.
2. The relation X ≻ Y is entailed by Q, Axioms K+G+R, and transitivity.
3. u(X) > u(Y ) for every u that is consistent with Q.
4. X match-dominates Y according to Q.
Proof. The equivalence of (1) and (3) is immediate for any setsX,Y , and used e.g. in [Reyhani and Wilson,
2012].
(2) ⇒ (3). If X ≻ Y follows from the axioms, then there is a sequence of sets X = X0 ≻ X1 ≻ · · · ≻
Xk = Y such that each Xj ≻ Xj+1 follows from a single axiom K,G, or R. Thus it is sufficient to show
for X ≻ Y that follows from a single axiom.
If X ≻ Y follows from Axiom R, then X = {a}∪W,Y = {b}∪W for some W ⊆ C \ {a, b} and a ≻ b.
Thus
u(X) = u({a}∪W ) =
1
|W |+ 1|
(
u(a) +
∑
c∈W
u(c)
)
>
1
|W |+ 1|
(
u(b) +
∑
c∈W
u(c)
)
= u({b}∪W ) = u(Y ).
1Without some restriction on X, Y , the lemma is incorrect. E.g. if x1 ≻ y1 ≻ y2 ≻ x2 ≻ y3 ≻ y4, then X stochastically
dominates Y but there is no way to derive X ≻ Y from the axioms K+G+R.
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If X ≻ Y follows from Axiom G, then either X = Y ∪ {a} and a ≻ b for all b ∈ Y , or X = {x} and
Y = {x} ∪W where x ≻ w for all w ∈W . For the first case
u(X) =
1
|Y |+ 1|
u(a) +
1
|Y |+ 1
∑
y∈Y
u(y) =
1
|Y |+ 1
1
|Y |
∑
y∈Y
u(a) +
1
|Y |+ 1
∑
y∈Y
u(y)
>
1
|Y |+ 1|
1
|Y |
∑
y∈Y
u(y) +
1
|Y |+ 1|
∑
y∈Y
u(y)
=
(
1 +
1
|Y |
)
1
|Y |+ 1
∑
y∈Y
u(y) =
1
|Y |
∑
y∈Y
u(y) = u(Y ).
For the second case,
u(X) = u(x) =
1
|Y |
∑
y∈Y
u(x) =
1
|Y |
(
u(x) +
∑
w∈W
u(x)
)
>
1
|Y |
(
u(x) +
∑
w∈W
u(w)
)
= u(Y ).
If X ≻ Y follows from Axiom K, then u(x) > u(y) for any x ∈ X, y ∈ Y which is a trivial case.
(3) ⇒ (4). Suppose that u(X) > u(Y ) for all u. Suppose first |X | ≤ |Y |. If |X | does not match-
dominate Y then either (I) there is an element xj′ that is less preferred than some element y
′ ∈ Yj′ ; or
(II) for all j and all y ∈ Yj , xj =Q y and |Yj | =
K
k
= q for all j. We will derive a contradiction to (3) in
either case. In the latter case, we have u(xj) = u(Yj) for all j and thus
u(Y ) =
1
K

∑
j≤k
|Yj |u(Yj)

 =
∑
j≤k qu(xj)
K
=
∑
j≤k qu(xj)
kq
= u(X),
In contradiction to (3).
Thus we are left with case (I). That is, there are j′ ≤ k and y′ ∈ Yj′ s.t. xj′ ≺ y
′. We define the
(possibly empty) set X ′ ⊆ X as all elements {x : x ≻ xj′}. We define Y
′ ⊆ Y as {y : y  y′}. By
construction, for any j > j′, Yj ⊆ Y
′. Thus
|Y ′| ≥ 1+
k∑
j=j′+1
|Yj | = 1+
k∑
j=j′+1
(rj − rj−1) = (K− rj′ )+1 = (K−
⌈
j′
k
K
⌉
)+1 > K−
j′
k
K = K(1−
j′
k
),
whereas |X ′| ≤ k − j′. We define u as follows: u(x) = 1, u(y) = 1 for all x ∈ X ′, y ∈ Y , and u(z) = 0 for
all other elements. Note that X ′, Y ′ contain the top elements of X,Y , respectively. In addition, y′ is the
minimal element in Y ′ and by transitivity y′ ≻ x for all x ∈ X \X ′. Thus u is consistent with Q.2
We argue that u(Y ) > u(X) in contradiction to (3). Indeed, u(X) = |X
′|
|X| ≤
k−j′
k
= 1− j
′
k
.
u(Y ) =
|Y ′|
|Y |
>
(1− j
′
k
)K
K
= 1−
j′
k
=
k − j′
k
≥
|X ′|
|X |
= u(X),
so we get a contradiction to (3) again. Thus X matching-dominate Y .
(4) ⇒ (2). This is the only part of the proof where we use the profiles from which X,Y are obtained.
When a single voter moves, either the winner set changes by a single candidate (added, removed, or
swapped), or X is a single candidate, or Y is a single candidate. We prove case by case.
• The case where |X | = |Y | = 1 is immediate.
• Suppose |X | = 1 (i.e. X = {x}) and |Y | = K > 1. Then X match-dominates Y means that x  y
for all y ∈ Y , with at least one relation being strict, w.l.o.g. yK (least preferred in Y ). Then
X  {y1, . . . , yK−1} ≻ Y , where the first transition is by Axiom K2 and the second is by Axiom G.
2If we want u to respect the strict order Q, we can vary the cardinal preferences within each set X′, Y ′,X \X′, Y \ Y ′
s.t. the differences within each set are less than ǫ. For sufficiently small ǫ (say, ǫ < 1
k2
) the proof goes through.
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• The case of |Y | = 1 is symmetric.
• Suppose |X | = |Y | = k. Then X match-dominates Y means that x  y for all i. For all t ∈
{0, 1, . . . , k}, let Xt = {x1, . . . , xt, yt+1, . . . , yk}. Then X
t−1 = Xt if xt = yt, and X
t−1 ≻ Xt
otherwise from Axiom R. In addition, X = X0, Y = Xk thus X ≻ Y from transitivity.
• Suppose |X | = k, |Y | = k + 1. Then X match-dominates Y means that |Y1| =
⌈
k+1
k
⌉
= 2, and
all other sets Yj are singletons Yj = yj . Consider the set Y
′ that includes the top k elements of
Y . Since x1 is (weakly) preferred to both candidates in Y1, Y
′ is match-dominated by X . By the
previous bullet X  Y ′ follows from Axiom R and transitivity. Finally, Y ′ ≻ Y = Y ′ ∪ {minY } by
Axiom G.
The following is an immediate corollary:
Proposition 2. A step a
i
→ a′ is a better-response under random tie-breaking and stochastic dominance,
if and only if f(a′) ≻ f(a) is entailed by Q, the Axioms K+G+R, and transitivity.
3 A Full Characterization of Stochastic Dominance Preferences
Lemma 1 provides an axiomatic characterization for any pair of subsets that are the result of a single
voter move (under Plurality). What if we want to characterize all pairwise relations? To that end, we
need another axiom. In addition, the set-extension of Q applies to multisets and not just to sets.
Definition 3.1. Consider a preference order Q over a set C. A partial extension Qˆ to multisets (that
are subsets of C) respects Monotone Duplication (MD) if the following holds for any X = {x1, . . . , xk}
in non-decreasing order according to Q, and Y is a multiset where each xj appears hj ≥ 0 times:
1. If (hj)j≤k is non-decreasing then Y Qˆ X;
2. If (hj)j≤k is non-increasing then Y Qˆ X;
3. If (hj)j≤k are not all equal, then Y 6=Qˆ X (preference is strict).
Since we now allow multisets, we require all Axioms to apply for weak preferences as well.
Axiom Definition
K1 (∀a ∈ X, b ∈ Y, a ≻ b) ⇒ X ≻ Y
K2 (∀a ∈ X, b ∈ Y, a  b) ⇒ X  Y
G1 (∀b ∈ X, a ≻i b) ⇒ {a} ≻ ({a} ∪X) ≻ X
G2 (∀b ∈ X, a  b) ⇒ {a}  ({a} ∪X)  X
R1 a ≻ b ⇐⇒ ∀X ⊆ C \ {a, b}, ({a} ∪X) ≻ ({b} ∪X)
R2 a  b ⇐⇒ ∀X ⊆ C \ {a, b}, ({a} ∪X)  ({b} ∪X)
Observation 3. Axiom MD entails Axiom G.
To see why, note that given a set A and b s.t. b ≻ a for all a ∈ A, we can define X = A ∪
{b}, Y1 = {b}, then Y1 is obtained from X by duplication with h1 = · · · = c|A|−1 = 0, h|A| = 1. Thus by
Axiom MD1+MD3 we get {b} ≻ {b}∪A. Similarly, for Y2 = A we get for h1 = · · · = c|A|−1 = 1, h|A| = 0
and Axioms D2+D3 that {b} ∪ A ≻ A.
Theorem 4. Let X,Y ⊆ C. The following conditions are equivalent for any strict order Q over C:
1. X stochastically dominates Y under preferences Q and uniform lottery.
2. The relation X ≻ Y is entailed by Q, Axioms K+MD+R, and transitivity.
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3. u(X) > u(Y ) for every u that is consistent with Q.
4. X match-dominates Y according to Q.
Proof. Lemma 1 already shows (1)⇐⇒ (3) and (2)⇒(3)⇒(4) for Axioms K+G+R, without any further
condition. Since Axiom MD is stronger than G these entailments still hold for Axioms K+MD+R. It
remains to show that (4)⇒(2) under these axioms.
We prove for the case where |X | ≤ |Y |. We start with Y and generate a multisets Y ′ by for each j ≤ k
replacing each y ∈ Yj with |Yj | copies of xj . Since xj  y for each such replacement, we get Y
′  Y by
(weak) Axiom R and transitivity.
Then by Axiom MD2 we have that X  Y ′, since for every j < j′ ≤ k, Y ′ contains (weakly) more
copies of xj than of xj′ . Therefore X  Y
′  Y .
To show that the preference is strict, we consider the two cases of Def. 2.1: either (IIa) at least one
relation xj ≻ y is strict, or (IIb) K mod k 6= 0. In case (IIa), we get that Y
′ ≻ Y by strict Axiom R. In
Case (IIb), we get that the sizes hj in Y
′ are not all the same, and thus by Axioms MD2+MD3 X ≻ Y ′.
In either case, X ≻ Y so we are done.
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